EU Law Blog

Uncastrated Pigs, State Liability and Limitation Periods: Case C-445/06

The principle of State liability for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which the State can be held responsible is now very well established (Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others, paragraph 35; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 31; Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas, paragraph 24; and Joined Cases C-178/94, C‑179/94 and C-188/94 to C‑190/94 Dillenkofer and Others, paragraph 20).

But what is the relationship between a national action in damages and an infringement procedure brought by the Commission pursuant to Article 226 ? Does an infringement action interrupt a national limitation period ? When does the national limitation period start to run if a member State has failed to implement a directive properly ? Must the person alleging loss and damage mitigate the loss suffered ? Those are some of the questions dealt with by the Court of Justice's judgment in Case C-445/06 Danske Slagterier v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

The facts are.... agricultural. Danske Slagterier is an association of Danish slaughterhouse companies and pig farmers. It claims compensation from the German Federal state for loss due to an infringement of EU law. It alleges that, in breach of EU law, Germany imposed an import ban on meat from uncastrated male pigs from 1993 to 1999. That ban led to a considerable financial loss.

What happened was that at the beginning of the 1990s, a project called the ‘Male-Pig-Projekt’, whose objective was the farming of uncastrated male pigs, was launched in Denmark. That type of farming, which is profitable, entails the risk of the meat, when heated, giving off a pronounced sexual odour. The German authorities considered that the smell was attributable to the hormone androstenone, the formation of which can be avoided by castration at an early stage.

In January 1993, Germany informed the other member States that the rule laid down in Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 64/433 had been transposed into national law in such a way that a threshold of 0.5 µg/g was fixed for androstenone; if that threshold were exceeded, the meat would give off a pronounced boar taint and would thus be unfit for human consumption. Germany also stated then that only Professor Claus’s modified enzyme immunoassay was recognised as a specific method for identifying androstenone and that meat from uncastrated male pigs exceeding that threshold could not be transported as fresh meat into Germany.

As a consequence, many consignments of pigmeat from Denmark were subsequently checked by the German authorities and rejected because they exceeded the threshold for androstenone. Also, the pig farmers and slaughterhouse companies which had almost ceased production of castrated male pigs had to resume such production in order not to put exports to Germany at risk. Danske Slagterier claims that if the pigmeat exported had come from uncastrated pigs as envisaged by the Male-Pig-Projekt, considerable costs savings could have been achieved.

Danske Slagterier brought an action for damages against the German Federal state before the competent court in Bonn. At first instance it was held that the action was well founded in respect of the period commencing on 7 December 1996 and dismissed the action as time-barred in respect of losses which had arisen before that date. On appeal, the entire claim was uheld on the merits. The Federal State then appealed to the Supreme court, the Bundesgerichtshof.

Meanwhile, the Commission had commenced article 226 proceedings against Germany. The Court of Justice held in those proceedings by its judgment of November 12th 1998 in Case C-102/96 Commission v. Germany that Germany had breached Directive 64/433 and Directive 89/662 by imposing the obligation of marking the carcasses of uncastrated male pigs and subjecting them to heat treatment whenever the meat, regardless of carcasse weight, had an androstenone content of more than 0.5 μg/g, as shown by Professor Claus's modified enzyme immunoassay, and by regarding the meat as giving off a pronounced sexual odour and consequently unfit for human consumption if the threshold of 0.5 μg/g of androstenone was exceeded.

The German Federal Supreme Court asked the Court of Justice a series of questions on the relationship between the Article 226 judgment and the pending action in damages.

The national court asked whether, where the Commission has brought infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC, EU law requires the limitation period laid down by national legislation for a claim seeking reparation on account of State liability for breach of EU law to be interrupted or suspended during those proceedings, if there is no effective legal remedy in the State in question to compel it to transpose a directive.

The Court of Justice held that that, where the Commission has brought infringement proceedings, EU law does not require any such interruption or suspension during those proceedings.In that regard, the Court recalls that the purpose of infringement proceedings is not to safeguard individual rights and individuals have no right to require the Commission to adopt a specific position (Case 247/87 Star Fruit v. Commission).

The national court also asked whether the limitation period applicable to an action for damages against the State for incorrect transposition of a directive begins to run, irrespective of the applicable national law, only when the directive has been fully transposed, or whether that period begins to run, in accordance with national law, on the date on which the first injurious effects of the incorrect transposition have been produced and further injurious effects thereof are foreseeable.

The Court held that EU law does not preclude the limitation period applicable to an action for damages against the State for incorrect transposition of a directive from beginning to run on the date on which the first injurious effects of the incorrect transposition have been produced and the further injurious effects are foreseeable, even if that date is prior to the correct transposition of the directive. The Court confronted the problem judgment of Case C-208/90 Emmott in which it had held in paragraph 23 that, until such time as a directive has been properly transposed, a defaulting member State may not rely on an individual’s delay in initiating proceedings against it in order to protect rights conferred upon him by the provisions of the directive and that a period laid down by national law within which proceedings must be initiated cannot begin to run before that time. But, recalled the Court, was confirmed in Case C-410/92 Johnson, paragraph 26, it was clear from Case C-338/91 Steenhorst-Neerings that the solution adopted in Emmott was justified by the particular circumstances of that case, in which a time-bar had the result of depriving the applicant in the main proceedings of any opportunity whatsoever to rely on her right to equal treatment under a directive (see also Case C-90/94 Haahr Petroleum, paragraph 52; Joined Cases C-114/95 and C‑115/95 Texaco and Olieselskabet Danmark, paragraph 48; and Joined Cases C-279/96 to C-281/96 Ansaldo Energia and Others, paragraph 20).

The Court held that it was clear in this case that the existence of the time-limit at issue did not have the result, as in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment in Emmott, of depriving the injured parties of any opportunity whatsoever to rely on their rights before the national courts.

Finally, the German court asked whether EU law precludes a rule such as that laid down in Paragraph 839(3) of the BGB which provides that an individual cannot obtain reparation for loss or damage which he has wilfully or negligently failed to avert by utilising a legal remedy.

The Court answered that EU law does not preclude the application of a national rule requiring mitigation of damage. It recalled that it is a general principle common to the legal systems of the Member States that the injured party must show reasonable diligence in limiting the extent of the loss or damage, or risk having to bear the loss or damage himself (Joined Cases C‑104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder and Others v. Council and Commission>, paragraph 33, and Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 85).

Examining EC Law Pleas on Own Motion and Reformatio in Pejus: Case C-455/06

The principle of "reformatio in pejus" is relatively common in Continental legal systems and means that an individual bringing an action cannot be placed in a less favorable position than if he had not brought the action in the first place. In Case C-455/06 Heemskerk BV, Firma Schaap v. Productschap Vee en Vlees the Court of Justice had to deal with the situation in which, if the national court were obliged to raise a point of EU law of its own motion, the result would leave the applicant in the national proceedings in a worse position than if he had not brought the action.

The facts need not detain us long. The applicants in the main proceedings were exporters of cattle from the Netherlands. They wanted to export cattle to Morocco and received an export subsidy to do so under the applicable EU agricultural rules. But it transpired that the vessel used to ship the cattle had been overloaded contrary to other applicable EU rules. The Dutch agricultural agency that paid out the subsidy, the Porductschap, required repayment of the amounts already paid. The exporters complained in an administrative procedure and as a result the Productschap took decisions that reduced the amounts to be repaid to it. Still not satisfied, the exporters challenged those decisions of the Productschap before a Dutch court. During the course of those judicial proceedings, the Dutch court identified other arguments based on EU law that could influence the outcome of the dispute but had not been raised by the parties.

Thus, the question was referred to the Court of Justice whether a national court must, as a matter of EU law, raise pleas based on EU law of its own motion if to do so would result in placing the applicant in a less favorable position than if he had not brought the action.

The Court of Justice held that where national law contains a principle such as the prohibition of reformatio in pejus, EU law cannot oblige a national court to apply EU law and legislation where to do so would run counter to that principle.

The Court of Justice held that an obligation to raise EU law of its own motion in such circumstances would be contrary not only to the principles of respect for the rights of the defence, legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, which underlie the prohibition, but would expose an individual who brought an action against an act adversely affecting him to the risk that such an action would place him in a less favourable position than he would have been in, had he not brought that action.

This case is an interesting sequel to that complex line of cases on the problem of national courts raising issues of EU law on their own motion we noted here, here and here.

Banana Saga and Liability in Absence of Illegality: Joined Cases C-120/06 P & C-121/06 P

A while ago, we noted a series of judgments of the Court of First Instance in which it examined whether the institutions could be liable in damages even in the absence of any illegality on their part. Now, the Court of Justice has addressed the issue in Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council and Commission.

Certain EC exporters suffered from the temporary compensatory measures imposed by the United States and claimed compensation from the EC. The United States imposed a 100% customs tariff on certain goods from a number of EU member States from April 19th 1999 to June 30th 2001 pursuant to section 301 of the Trade Act 1974 (19 U.S.C § 2411) (for an overview, see here) and authorized according to Article 22 § 7 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. The US measures were adopted because the EU had legislated in the banana sector in a manner contrary to the WTO rules. The EC exporters - none of whom were involved in bananas - lost trade as a consequence and sued the Council and Commission in damages.

The Court of First dismissed the claim of the traders in its judgments in Case T-151/00 Laboratoire du Bain v Council and Commission, Case T-135/01 Giorgio Fedon & Figli v. Council and Commission, Case T-69/00 FIAMM v. Council and Commission and Case T-383/00 Beamglow Ltd v. European Parliament, Council and Commission. It held that the institutions could be liable in damages even in the absence of any illegality on their part. To reach such a conclusion, it had exhumed the rather obscure judgment in Case 81/86 De Boer Buizen v. Council and Commission. To succeed, however, the plaintiffs had to show that the loss and damage they suffered was special and abnormal. The Court of First Instance held that it was not.

The traders then appealed that finding concerning the special and abnormal character of their loss to the Court of Justice. The Council and Commission cross-appealed on the point that they could be held liable in the absence of illegality when they act in their legislative capacity.

The Court of Justice upheld the result of the Court of First Instance (the traders don't get any compensation) but reverse the finding of principle of the Court of First Instance on liability in the absence of illegality: It held that the Council and Commission could not be liable in damages in the absence of illegality on their part when they act in their legislative capacity. (The Court of Justice actually dismisses the cross-appeals but substitutes its own reasoning for that of the Court of First Instance. So, really the result is pretty much the same as if the cross-appeals had been successful. Yeah, appeals are complicated!).

The judgment is rather tough going. The Court of Justice partly agreed with the Court of First Instance and partly disagreed radically with it.

First, the Court of Justice agreed with the Court of First Instance that it could not review the legality of the EC measures in issue in the light of the WTO rules. It recalled that it can examine the validity of secondary EC legislation in the light of an international treaty only where the nature and the broad logic of the latter do not preclude this and, in addition, the treaty’s provisions appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise (see, in particular, Case C‑308/06 Intertanko and Others, paragraph 45). As regards, more specifically, the WTO agreements, it is settled case-law that, given their nature and structure, those agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions (see, in particular, Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council, paragraph 47; Case C-93/02 P Biret International v Council, paragraph 52; and Case C-377/02 Van Parys, paragraph 39). It is only where the EC has intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the EC measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements, that the Court can review the legality of the EC measure in question in the light of the WTO rules (see Case C-93/02 P Biret International v Council, paragraph 53, and Case C-377/02 Van Parys, paragraph 40).

The Court of Justice agreed with the Court of First Instance that those conditions were not fulfilled and thus it could not review the legality of the EC measures in the light of the WTO rules in this case.

Then the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance part company.

Because the Court of First Instance could not find that the EC measures in issue were illegal in the light of the WTO rules, it had to find some other means to find the EC liable in principle (if not in actual fact) in these cases. That is why it imported the French concept of liability for loss caused by legislation in the absence of illegality on its part (see the 1938 Conseil D'Etat case of La Fleurette) (because the French Conseil d'Etat has no jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of legislation).

The Court of Justice held that while the principle of liability of the EU institutions in the event of illegal conduct (or omission) on their part was well established, liability in the absence of unlawful conduct was not firmly established. It held that as regards, more specifically, liability for legislative activity, that it had laid down at a very early stage that, although the principles in the legal systems of the Member States governing the liability of public authorities for damage caused to individuals by legislative measures vary considerably from one member State to another, it transpired that the public authorities can only incur liability for legislative measures in exceptional and special circumstances (Joined Cases 83/76, 94/76, 4/77, 15/77 and 40/77 Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe and Others v Council and Commission, paragraph 5). As a result, the Court held in particular that, in view of the second paragraph of Article 288 EC, the EC does not incur liability on account of a legislative measure which involves choices of economic policy unless a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual has occurred (see, inter alia, Joined Cases 9/71 and 11/71 Compagnie d’approvisionnement, de transport et de crédit and Grands Moulins de Paris v Commission, paragraph 13; Joined Cases 83/76, 94/76, 4/77, 15/77 and 40/77 Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe and Others v Council and Commission, paragraph 4; Case 50/86 Les Grands Moulins de Paris v EEC, paragraph 8; and Case C-119/88 AERPO and Others v Commission, paragraph 18).

The Court remarked that the strict approach taken towards the liability of the EU in the exercise of its legislative activities is attributable to two considerations. First, even where the legality of measures is subject to judicial review, exercise of the legislative function must not be hindered by the prospect of actions for damages whenever the general interest of the EC requires legislative measures to be adopted which may adversely affect individual interests. Second, in a legislative context characterised by the exercise of a wide discretion, which is essential for implementing an EC policy, the EC cannot incur liability unless the institution concerned has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers (see, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame, paragraph 45).

As a result, the Court of Justice concluded:

"[...] as Community law currently stands, no liability regime exists under which the Community can incur liability for conduct falling within the sphere of its legislative competence in a situation where any failure of such conduct to comply with the WTO agreements cannot be relied upon before the Community courts."

There's more that can be said about this judgment but that's enough for now. We'll save an interesting and odd twist for later.

Agricultural Revolution: Regulation 1234/2007

A brand new regulation - Council Regulation (EC) n° 1234/2007 of October 22nd 2007 establishing a common organization of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) - published recently brings about a quiet revolution in the agricultural sector. Not a revolution as dramatic as that brought about by Jethro Tull or Turnip Townshend but an important change in the legislative environment nonetheless.

Regulation 1234/2007 replaces 21 separate regulations establishing common organizations of markets for different agricultural products. It establishes a system common to all the products concerned. Those products include live trees, ornamental flowers, pigmeat, eggs, poultrymeat, raw tobacco, bananas, fruit and vegetables, processed fruit and vegetables, beef and veal, milk, wine, flax and hemp, sheep and goat meat, cereals, rice, dried fodder, olive oil, seeds, hops and sugar.

Up until now, each product had its own regulation setting up a common organization of the market. The consequence was a considerable degree of overlap between them and sometimes different mechanisms were adopted to solve similar or identical problems.

Of course, different rules will exist to take account of the particularities of each product. Nevertheless, the single regulation should simplify the regulatory environment considerably.

Regulation 1234/2007 enters into application on January 1st 2008.

For some useful background information on the Commission's proposal, see here. Some interesting "Questions and Answers" are available here.

Public policy, national proceedings, raising an issue on own motion: Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05

Is a national court, when examining the legality of a national administrative measure, required to raise of its own motion a plea alleging that the national measure has infringed certain provisions of EC legislation ? That is a difficult question to answer. And in Joined Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 van des Weerd and others the Court of Justice answered no, it was not so required as a matter of EC law.

These cases are in fact a sequel to Case C-28/05 G.J. Dokter, Maatschap Van den Top, W. Boekhout v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit which we wrote about here. What happened was that certain measures taken by the Dutch authorities to control the spread of foot and mouth disease were challenged before the competent Dutch court. The applicants in the main proceedings did not raise the issue of the compatibility of the Dutch measures with EC law, a point that had been raised in another case which gave rise to the ruling of the Court of Justice in Case C-28/05. The Dutch court was uncertain as to whether EC law requires it to take into account arguments based on EC law which had not been raised by the parties.

The Court of Justice held that in the circumstances of the present cases, the national court was not under an obligation to consider arguments of EC not raised by the parties.

The Court of Justice recalled that in the absence of Community rules in the field, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less favorable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and, secondly, that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel and van Veen , paragraph 17, and Case C-129/00 Commission v Italy, paragraph 25).

The Court examined, as regards the principle of equivalence, how and when as a matter of national law the national court court raise issues of its own motion. It found that it was clear from the order for reference that the Dutch court is competent to raise of its own motion issues relating to the infringement of rules of public policy, which are construed in Dutch law as meaning issues concerning the powers of administrative bodies and those of the court itself, and provisions as to admissibility. Those rules lie at the very basis of the national procedures, since they define the conditions in which those procedures may be initiated and the authorities which have the power, within their area of responsibility, to determine the extent of the rights and obligations of individuals. But, interestingly, the Court of Justice held that the provisions of EC law in issue in these proceedings were not equivalent to provisions dealing with matters of public policy.

As regards the principle of effectiveness, the Court recalled that each case which raises the question whether a national procedural provision renders the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order on individuals impossible or excessively difficult must be analyzed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (see, to that effect, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck, paragraph 14, and Van Schijndel and van Veen, paragraph 19).

The Court recalled also that the principle of effectiveness does not, in circumstances such as those which arise in the main proceedings, impose a duty on national courts to raise a plea based on a EC provision of their own motion, irrespective of the importance of that provision to the EC legal order, where the parties are given a genuine opportunity to raise a plea based on Community law before a national court.

The Court went on to distinguish Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss; Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores; Case C-473/00 Cofidis; and Case C‑168/05 Mostaza Claro.

For related posts, see our post on Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro and our post on Case C-234/04 Kapferer.

Accession of Bulgaria and Romania

The Commission has adopted its final monitoring report on the readiness of Bulgaria and Romania for EU membership by January 1st, 2007.

Basically, the Commission confirms that both Bulgaria and Romania are ready, kind of. For a succinct press release, look here. But a number of safeguard mechanisms are foreseen (politely called "accompanying measures") and those are described here.

The findings of the monitoring report on Bulgaria are summarized here and those for Romania are summarized here.

If you are really keen you can find the full version of the monitoring report here. And you call that "ready" ?

What seems like a new sort of measure is the adoption of a special regulation - Commission Regulation (EC) No 1423/2006 setting up a mechanism for what are euphemistically termed "appropriate measures" in the field of agricultural spending in respect of Bulgaria and Romania. That regulation will allow the Commission to suspend 25% of certain agricultural expenditure if a number of conditions are fulfilled.

Reform of the common agricultural policy and annulment: Case C-310/04

The Court's judgment in Case C-310/04 Spain v. Council is pretty much a textbook case on annulment actions and on how the Court approaches judicial review. So it is worth reading. But it also shows how difficult is a true and thorough reform of common agricultural policy from the inside. In that case, the Court annulled the parts of Regulation 1782/2003 as amended by Regulation 864/2004 on support for cotton because it breached the principle of proportionality.

The story goes like this. And this is a much simplified version. When Greece joined the EC back in 1980, a support scheme for cotton was introduced by Protocol 4 on cotton annexed to the Greek Act of Accession. Then the scheme was extended to Spain and Portugal when those countries joined in 1986. Basically, the support scheme took the form of an aid to cotton production.

Then, the Council adopted Regulation 1782/2003 as part of the reform of the common agricultural policy to "decouple" aid to farmers from actual production. The idea was to provide income support for farmers without inciting them to produce stuff no-one wanted at prices no-one could afford. The Council brought the cotton support scheme into line with that new general philosophy with Regulation 864/2004. But a complete alignment would have disrupted the cotton sector considerably so the Council split the support into two parts: 35% would be paid as support for production per eligible hectare and the remaining 65% would be paid over as income support irrespective of cotton production. The problem lay in how "eligible hectares" of production were defined and calculated. The Council defined "eligible hectares" rather restrictively as areas sown with cotton and maintained at least until the boll opening under normal growing conditions.

Spain brought an action to annul the new support scheme. It contended that the condition that the crop should be maintained until the boll opening was manifestly inappropriate for ensuring economic conditions which can ensure that cotton growing can continue and prevent the crop from being driven out by others.

The Court agreed with Spain. It held that the condition that the crop be maintained until the boll opening was disproportionate. The Court held that he Community legislature has, in agricultural matters, a wide discretion, corresponding to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 34 EC to 37 EC. Thus judicial review must be limited to verifying that the measure in question is not vitiated by any manifest error or misuse of powers and that the authority concerned has not manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (Case C‑189/01 Jippes and Others, paragraph 80). As to review of proportionality, the principle of proportionality requires that acts adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question; where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (Case C‑189/01 Jippes and Others paragraph 81). As regards judicial review of the implementation of that principle, bearing in mind the wide discretion enjoyed by the Community legislature where the common agricultural policy is concerned, the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate in terms of the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue. In this particular case, the Court held that one of the goals of the scheme was to ensure the maintenance of cotton production and prevent cotton being driven out by other crops. It found after careful review that the level of production aid (the 35% part) was insufficient to meet the objective assigned and that the institutions had not taken into account all the relevant factors in calculating the quantum of aid.

However, the Court suspended the effects of the annulment under Article 231 EC until such time as a new measure is adopted.

But the Court rejected other pleas adduced by Spain. It rejected the plea that the measure contained insufficient reasoning contrary to Article 253 EC. The Court found that in the case of a measure of general application, as here, the statement of reasons may be limited to indicating, first, the general situation which led to its adoption and, second, the general objectives which it is intended to achieve (see, inter alia, Case C‑342/03 Spain v Council, paragraph 55). If the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons for the various technical choices made (see, inter alia, Case C‑284/94 Spain v Council paragraph 30).

The Court also rejected a plea of misuse of powers. It held that an act is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been taken with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case (see, inter alia, Case C‑342/03 Spain v Council, paragraph 64). But Spain had produced no such evidence.

One final curiosity is worth mentioning. The case was assigned to a chamber comprising 5 judges (the second chamber). After the Council saw the Advocate General's opinion of March 16th, 2006, recommending annulment of the measure, it must have panicked and wrote to the Court to request that the case be transferred to the Grand Chamber under Article 16 of the Statute of the Court. The Court held that it was too late for such a transfer: unjustified delay would be caused and would be contrary to the requirement of the proper administration of justice.

New sugar market

The new Council Regulation on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector - Council Regulation n° 318/2006 - has been published.

It enters into force on March 3rd, 2006.

It aims to cure some of the major ills of the old sugar market which was highly protectionist and kept prices in the EC artificially high. Apart from that just go and read it for yourselves.... Who said EC law was easy ?